

5 Interaction sequences and anticipatory interactive planning

In this chapter I shall consider some relationships between sequential patterns or organizations in talk-in-interaction, notably in conversation, and that aspect of social intelligence which Goody has termed ‘anticipatory interactive planning’ (hereafter AIP). Social intelligence consists, in part anyway, of cognitive models of action which might underlie the production and interpretation of ‘meaningful’ communicative behaviour among social beings (humans, and possibly some primates; see Byrne, Chapter 1, this volume). AIP highlights the reciprocity of communication in social relations, incorporating as it does the mental representation of alter’s responses to ego’s actions (Goody, Introduction to this volume). Goody is thereby suggesting that AIP concerns the possibility that, via their cognitive models of action, interactants have ways of predicting that if they make a given verbal ‘move’ (and from now on I shall refer exclusively to those actions which are verbal), this will engender or facilitate a subsequent verbal action by either themselves or their recipients. The predictability of some contingent subsequent action(s) is part of ‘mentally modelling’ the likely behaviour/responses of their co-interactants, which hence underpins the strategic nature of selecting a current action.

The ability to anticipate subsequent verbal actions, performed in turns at talk, and to select or design a current action (turn) accordingly, would seem to rest on the cognitive representation of *sequences* of actions. I mean by ‘sequences of actions’ the discernible shapes, patterns, organizations or regularities which may be associated with, or which may be the products of, the progressivity of participants’ decisions about ‘what to say next’ in response to what was just said. (An extended account of the progressively unfolding character of contributions to talk, from the perspective of those participating in the talk, in real time, is given in Streeck’s chapter in this volume; hence it is unnecessary to say more about that here.) Thus, underlying AIP is some mental representation of interaction sequences. For this reason I shall focus here on the ways in which sequential patterns might be associated with AIP, and particularly on whether a current turn-at-talk might be produced with an eye to an anticipated future slot or move in a sequence.

I am going to be considering whether a case can be made for the possibility that AIP may involve the conscious use by speakers of knowledge of sequential patterns, in attempts to generate subsequent environments or slots in a sequence in which favoured or unwanted actions may be, respectively, performed or avoided. However, it should not be supposed that the relationship between social intelligence and manifest verbal behaviour is one which necessarily involves consciously planned action. Communicative strategies do not need to be located at the conscious level of intentionality of speakers; nor do the other concepts associated with AIP such as 'planning', 'anticipation', 'predictability' and 'control'. It is perfectly consistent with AIP to regard the 'mental imaging' of interactive sequences as cognitive procedures for action and interpretation, and not as part of the overt social knowledge which speakers may possess in order consciously to model the contingent responses of their co-interactants. It is thus not necessary to account for sequential patterns in terms of these being the products of speakers' conscious knowledge of the organizations that inform their conduct (Heritage 1984: 241; 1990/91). Whilst participants may orient to stable patterns of talk-in-interaction (and hence recognize the planned, predictable and rational character of communicative actions), this does not imply that particular speakers on particular occasions engage in consciously planning their utterances. Social intelligence may consist of social procedures for action and interpretation, without these procedures becoming the objects of conscious articulation (in the mind, at least) on the occasions of their use.¹ We are not, then, required to find evidence of conscious intentionality in order to sustain the view that 'anticipatory planning' involves interactants' representations – at a cognitive level – of the organized contingencies generated by the selection of actions.

Indeed, the very business of considering what evidence there might be for the conscious or intentional use of sequential strategies might appear to risk confusing interactants' attributions of intentionality to one another with an analyst's version of participants' intentions (in something like a reconstructed narrative conversation). When participants engage in a conversation, any move or turn in that conversation is accountable; that is, inferring what an utterance means and selecting an appropriate response involves ascribing intentions to our co-interactants. The case for the centrality of intention-attribution in making 'rapid interactional moves in an ongoing sequence of actions structured at many levels' is elegantly argued in Levinson's contribution to this volume (Chapter 11, p. 221). Indeed, Levinson defines social intelligence as 'just and only the core ability to attribute intention to other agent's actions, communicative or otherwise, and to respond appropriately in interdigitated sequences of actions' (n. 1). Thus it might appear that the focus of enquiry ought to be

not
consciously
planned



intention

fixed on co-participants' attributions of intentionality to one another's actions. To do otherwise might risk missing the domain of interactional accountability for participants in the conversation itself.

Certainly our investigations of the social organization of talk-in-interaction should continue to focus primarily on participants' analyses of one another's conduct, their understanding of what each other means/intends, and on the consequent sequential progressivity of talk. Nevertheless, we might also consider whether participants, under certain circumstances and for certain sequential patterns, may consciously 'orient to' knowledge of those patterns and employ that knowledge in an intentionally strategic sense. Whilst the planning, anticipation, control, strategy and prediction which are associated with AIP may be cognitive operations, there might be evidence that on occasions these are conscious operations of sequential management.

There are plainly certain respects in which conversationalists consciously orient to sequential patterns. For example, the structure of greetings exchanges is well enough known for people to anticipate what they should do in a particular slot when they come to greet someone (e.g. should they kiss or shake hands?), or in the course of a greeting, to choose the appropriate moment for the performance of an anticipated move in the exchange.² Knowledge about such 'ritualized' exchanges, and how to behave with propriety during them, is of course so much part of the vernacular that they may be taught to children as rules of social conduct.³ Furthermore, such knowledge is a resource for deception: for example, in a telephone greeting a caller may design his/her opening turns in the greeting exchange so as playfully to deceive the person s/he has called into believing that s/he (the caller) is not known to the called, when in fact s/he is (for an analysis of which see Drew (1991)).

But there are more complex sequences which might manifest the intentionality of conduct. For instance, Jefferson (1993) reports that in circumstances where a recipient has apparently misunderstood a question, and replied about something which was not asked, the speaker (i.e. the one who asked the question) may refrain from correcting the recipient; instead the speaker first responds appropriately to the answer, and then re-asks the original question. So the speaker allows an error to go uncorrected: but the subsequent move of re-asking the question (in a manner which has a 'first time' appearance) demonstrates that the speaker understood that an error had been made (i.e. the error was observably relevant to the speaker, and did not simply go unnoticed) and puts things to rights. Such instances involve more than the (cognitive) orientation to a procedure: the sequence is evidence of the speaker recognizing the recipient's error, refraining from correcting it, but remedying the error by choosing to ask the question again – all of which manifests the speaker's

consciousness of the error, and the intention to pursue the original question.

So what I am beginning to consider here is whether there is evidence, in the sequential management of talk, for participants' conscious orientation to sequential patterns or procedures. If there were such evidence, then the procedures or organizations which underlie what Levinson refers to as 'interactive intelligence' could be employed at a conscious level of anticipatory planning of subsequent moves or turns in a sequence. If so, we could add a level of consciousness in actors' representations of their own actions and the contingent responsive actions of others – envisaged by AIP – to the cognitive imprinting of the procedures for producing and interpreting conduct. The issue is whether the knowledge of sequential patterns which underlies mental representations of action may be consciously exploited in interaction.

A couple of caveats, very briefly. First, undoubtedly there are many other areas of research into the organization of conversation which have a close bearing on social or interactional intelligence and to AIP, but which will not be touched upon here. Such areas as 'recipient design' and the organization of self- and other-repair are, for instance, quite evidently related to anticipatory planning: Streeck touches on these phenomena, especially self-repair, in his analysis of 'projection' (Chapter 4, this volume). I shall not be considering the details of the design of particular speaker turns, except insofar as the action which a speaker selects to do in a turn has sequential consequences. Second, I shall not be concerned with the larger or more diffuse goals which participants might have in conversing (such as the order of priority in the day's business, cementing a friendship or securing the other's co-operation), or in choosing to raise a particular topic in the conversation. Although the pursuit of such goals is certainly to be considered part of AIP modelling, I do not deal here with how far such goals may be evident in particular conversational sequences (but see particularly the various contributions to Tracy (1991) for a consideration of goal-directedness in conversation). The discussion which follows is focused just on the management and planning of local sequences (or types of sequences), involving local sequentially constrained goals.

Some types of sequential patterns in conversation

It was noted above that certain sequences are so conventionalized as to be part of the vernacular, for instance in instructing children how to behave properly: so children are taught to say 'thank you' when given something, to answer questions and to say 'hello' when greeted by another. Such

sequences as greetings–greetings and questions–answers are instances of what have been termed in conversation analysis ‘adjacency pairs’: this is a large class of sequences in which the production by one speaker of a first action (e.g. a question, request, offer, greeting, invitation, accusation etc.) occasions the relevance by the recipient of a paired next action (e.g. an answer) or one from alternative paired actions (e.g. acceptance/rejection, granting/rejection). The conventionalized expectation that if a speaker’s turn or utterance is hearable as the first part of such a pair, then the recipient should enact the second paired response, is a demonstrably ‘strong’ normative sequential constraint on what a recipient should appropriately do in the next turn (Atkinson and Drew 1979: 46–61; Heritage 1984: 245–60; Levinson 1983, ch.6; H. Sacks 1986; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). The projectability of relevant next paired actions is a quite elementary but perhaps fundamental mechanism for anticipating alter’s response (i.e., *class* of response), and hence is most important for AIP.

However, in sequences of adjacently paired actions, only one move ahead – the adjacent next action by speaker B, in response to the first pair-part by speaker A – can be projected or anticipated. Whilst the conditional relevance associated with adjacency pairs provides for strong constraints controlling ‘next position’, it appears that the sequential organizations for conversation are relatively weaker in terms of there being structures which control or project actions beyond that.⁴ Research in conversation analysis (and from other perspectives for the analysis of discourse) has identified very many sequential patterns of three or more turns or moves: but these patterns are, I think, not all equivalent forms of organization with respect to participants’ sequential management of talk, and in particular to the projectability of future turns in the sequences.

This can be illustrated by considering three kinds of sequential patterns which have been discerned in conversation.

Teases

The first is a pattern associated with ‘po-faced receipts of teases’, a phenomenon in which recipients of teases overwhelmingly respond to the tease in some serious fashion (Drew 1987). Even in cases where recipients do respond to the humour in a tease, for example by laughing, they almost always do so either as a preliminary to or in the course of making a serious response.⁵ The following is an instance; Nancy has called Emma to tell her about a man she met the previous evening at the home of a close friend (Martha).

Extract 1 (NB:II:4:14)

- NANCY: But he's ni:ce looki:ng a::nd ah just a rea:l nice:
 = PERsonable, VERY personable, VERY SWEET. .hhh
 VE:RY: (.) CONSIDERATE MY GOD ALL I HAD
 TO DO WAS LOOK AT A CIGARETTE AND HE
 WAS OUT OF THE CHAIR LIGHTING (h)IT
 YhhhOU KNO(h)OW =
- EMMA: = I: KNO:W IT
- NANCY: .hehh.hh One of those kind .hhhhh =
- EMMA: = Yes
- NANCY: A::nd so: but we were
- EMMA: [THEY DO THAT BEFORE AND A:FTER
- NANCY: [eeYhhehee [AHH
- EMMA: THEY DO:n't.
- NANCY: HAH HAH.hhh
- NANCY: NO:?e-MARTHA HAS known Cli:ff, ... ((a good 30 years
 and he's an absolute boyscout))

In response to Emma's somewhat sexually laden tease 'THEY DO THAT BEFORE AND A:FTER THEY DO:n't', Nancy begins by laughingly agreeing: but she then rejects the teasing proposal with [No] + [Serious Account], 'NO:?e-MARTHA HAS known Cli:ff ...'. This phenomenon of serious responses to humorous teases (in only a very few instances did recipients respond to the humour alone) is partly accounted for by the sequential environment in which teases occur. In all the instances I collected, in the turn(s) immediately preceding the tease the person who is subsequently teased has been complaining, extolling/praising or bragging in an *exaggerated* or overdone fashion. Space prevents illustrating the extent to which in extract 1 Nancy had been extolling the attractions and virtues of the man she met. But a flavour of it is conveyed in her first turn in the extract; and this comes at the end of an extravagant report of this man's comparative youthfulness (Nancy is well into middle age), that he was a senior officer in the marines, that he has a responsible job, his easygoing manner, his intelligence, how well they hit it off and so on.

The sequential context in which teases occur is, then, typically one in which the recipient has gone on extolling something or someone, has gone on complaining or been self-pitying. The subsequent tease, conveying some scepticism about what the teased has said, has a social control function insofar as it may be considered a mild form of reproof for a minor conversational transgression. The sequential pattern associated with teases, and which is illustrated in extract 1, can be summarized thus:

- A: Exaggerated Extolling/Praising/Complaining
- B: Tease
- A: Serious Response

Preference for agreement

The second kind of pattern that I want to consider is associated with an aspect of the organization of the preference for agreements with assessments, and a dispreference for disagreements (Pomerantz 1984; see also H. Sacks 1986). Pomerantz documented how the dispreferred character of disagreement is evident in such actions being withheld or delayed: a recipient may delay disagreeing with the first speaker's assessment either by the design of a turn (by prefacing the upcoming disagreement with an agreement component) or sequentially – or the recipient may withhold a response. In the following two cases recipients withhold their response to the first speakers' assessments.

Extract 2 (NB:III:6)

- FRAN: Oh::: Wih gee isn'tat funny gee I'm going down t'see
 somebody they're going do:wn the end a' this month et
 twunty seven hundred- .hhh Ocean Fro::nt.
 (0.7)
- FRAN: Is that a diffrent pla:ce then Newpo:rt?
 TED: M-hm I gue:ss, this is, Balboa Penninsula.

Extract 3 (G.L.2: from Frankel 1983)

- PATIENT: This- chemotherapy (0.2) it won't have any lasting effects
 on havin' kids will it?
 (2.2)
- PATIENT: It will?
 DOCTOR: I'm afraid so.

In extract 2 Fran's assessment is conveyed in 'gee isn'tat funny', a claimed coincidence that people she's going to be visiting are staying in, as she thinks, the same vicinity as Ted. In extract 3 the patient's question conveys an evaluation (by selecting 'It won't have . . .', rather than asking 'Will it have . . .'). In each case, following the pause in which the recipient does not respond, the speaker (respectively, Fran and the Patient) apparently recognizes that she had it wrong, and offers instead a revised position, with which now the recipient straightaway agrees. Thus silences may be oriented to as potential disagreements, with the interactional consequence that 'It is not only that what would be a disagreement might

not get said, but that what comes to be said may be said as an agreement' (Pomerantz 1984: 77). A simplified version of the sequential pattern which emerges from this orientation to recipient silence post-assessment is:

- A: Assessment
 Silence
 A: Backdown/Modified Position
 B: Agreement

Pre-sequences

The third kind of sequence relevant to a preliminary consideration of the possible relationship between AIP and sequential organizations will also be familiar: it is conversational pre-sequences, such as pre-invitations, pre-requests and such like. These are questions or enquiries which are made on behalf of a next action, contingent upon the response to the enquiry (Atkinson and Drew 1979: 141–8; Levinson 1983: 345–64; Schegloff 1980). The following instance is particularly transparent, and – what is most to the point here – is particularly transparent to the recipient (Jim) of the pre-sequence enquiry.

Extract 4 (Holt:2:14)

- JIM: J.P.Blenkinsop good morning,
 (.)
 SKIP: Good morning Ji:m,
 (0.5)
 SKIP: Uh it's Skip.
 JIM: Hiyuh,
 SKIP: You coming past the doo:r,
 JIM: Certainly?
 (0.8)
 → JIM: What time wouldju like the car Sah. =
 SKIP: -Uh well eh^{hh} h^{hehh} h^{hhehh} h^{hehh} .hh Oh that's
 m:ost unexpected of you h^{hh}::: n(h)o it's v(h)ery
 nice'v you to offer huhh uh-heh heh-u-hu-.ehh
 Thanks very much. .hhh
 [
 JIM: Eh:m I wz planning tih leave
 here at just about twenty . . .

The enquiry 'You coming past the doo:r,' is treated by Jim as a prefatory enquiry, as leading up to something. His recognition that Skip 'wants something' is particularly evident in his humorous response to the enquiry: 'What time wouldju like the car Sah' humorously mimics what a

chauffeur might ask – but it is also an offer (of a lift to work). As such, it displays Jim's understanding that Skip's enquiry was made in the service of requesting a lift, a request which does not now need to be made. Thus, whereas the usual pattern or 'standard sequence' associated with pre-sequences is

- A: Pre-request enquiry
- B: Response
- A: Request
- B: Granting,

here the sequence is attenuated in a way which commonly happens when the recipient, recognizing what the enquiry is leading to, opts to address the projected action directly (i.e. without waiting for the request to be officially or formally made).

- A: Pre-request enquiry
- B: Offer
- A: Acceptance

These then are three examples of the kinds of sequential patterns or organizations which have been uncovered in conversation analytic research. They are each an instance of what might be regarded as 'conversational routines' (Coulmas 1981a). But they have, I think, rather different potentials for the role of *projectability* in 'anticipatory interactive planning'. I have selected these to illustrate or represent, in a preliminary fashion, some of the ways in which sequential patterns may or may not be associated with conscious 'strategy', or the ability to plan for subsequent moves in a sequence.

The first sequential pattern, associated with teases and po-faced responses to them, does not appear to involve projectability at any stage in the sequence. The exaggerated complainings, praising etc. only 'initiate' the teasing sequence insofar as the recipient responds (sceptically) to the overdone version. It is plainly no part of the design of the complaint/praise to generate or provide the occasion for a tease. Likewise, the tease is not designed to generate the third stage in the sequence, the serious response/denial (indeed there's every reason to treat teases as designed *not* to be taken seriously). And both the tease and po-faced response are 'backward-looking' responses to prior actions;⁶ they are not themselves designed to project any next actions. So whilst there is a discernible sequential pattern associated with teasing, no individual move in the sequence seems to be part of any manifest strategic repertoire. At each stage participants are oriented to a prior turn, and not to some projected subsequent turn. The overall 'shape' of the sequence is not what either was aiming to exploit.

There are, I think, many examples of sequential patterns of this kind, in which the overall organization of the sequence is not being oriented to by co-participants. Their shape is discernible to the analyst; and of course the regularity of the sequential pattern is the product of common interactional problems or goals which participants manage, or find solutions to, in typical ways/moves. But the project of participants is not to design a current turn with an eye to any projected action in the sequence. The sequential pattern is the product of a turn-by-turn progression through a series of 'typical' interactional contingencies (e.g. dealing with an exaggerated version of a complaint). It is not the product of participants' mental representation of a projected sequence, and the exploitation of a move within such a sequence.⁷

The other sequences illustrated above, associated with speaker modifications/backdowns post recipient withholding, and with pre-requests, seem to be rather different organizations, inasmuch as they do manifest participants' orientation to projectable next slots or moves.⁸ In the former, that orientation is quite implicit; and the turn projected is that adjacent next turn. In the latter, in pre-sequences, that orientation may be explicit; it need not be explicit but, as extract 4 (above) illustrates, participants can and do overtly display their understanding that the business of a current turn is some projected action in the sequence. And in this case the projected action is not restricted to the adjacent next turn: the pre-sequence enquiry is designed – and recognized by the recipient as designed – with a view to both the next-but-one turn (the request), and the turn after that (the response to the enquiry indicating the likelihood of the request being granted, and the making of the request being contingent upon such a 'promising' response).

Pre-sequences seem then to sit opposite the kind of patterns illustrated in teasing sequences. Pre-sequences are manifestly initiated with an interactional goal in view, to see whether a request – if it were made – would be received favourably, or (as in extract 4) to elicit an offer. And the fact that the shape of the sequence – what the pre-sequence enquiry is recognizably leading to etc. – is part of the speaker's conscious design or strategy is evident in the playful way Jim exposes that design.

The pattern of speaker backdowns post recipient silences lies somewhere between 'non-projectable organizations' and the designedly strategic nature of pre-sequences. Although recipient withholdings/silences are generated by the speakers' initial assessments, those assessments are not, of course, designed to generate the sequence resulting in the speakers' backdowns. And whilst the speakers' backdowns display their recognition that the recipients disagree, we can only speculate that recipients hold off from responding (remain silent) in the first place in an

unspoken effort to get their co-participants to modify their position, and thereby provide the opportunity, in a subsequent slot, for agreement. It seems very likely that recipients do so: based on what Heritage (1984:241) refers to as the symmetry between the procedures for the production of verbal conduct, and for its interpretation, recipients may withhold a response and hence 'produce' silences in order to have the speaker recognize their (implicit) disagreement. Recipients may thereby simultaneously orient to the *avoidance* of a projected action (i.e., their disagreement), and turn the sequence into one which will end instead in agreement. But the evidence for this orientation/management lies implicitly in the sequential pattern.

The points which emerge from this very preliminary consideration of three kinds of conversational sequences are, quite briefly, these. By no means are all sequential patterns or organizations evidence of interactive planning by participants. Whilst the orderliness of the pattern is produced in the first instance by participants, they may be acting in response to interactional contingencies, without any view to the overall organization of a sequence, or to any particular stage in it. What may be characteristic of sequences which appear to be the product of participants' interactive planning is that the sequential organization is sufficiently part of members' conscious linguistic/interactive repertoire that future moves in the sequence can be *projected*, or anticipated: and that such a projection can be exploited in order to pursue some interactional goal. (Though note that that goal may not necessarily spring from personal motivation or be strategically self-serving; it may be, as in withholding disagreement, a matter of social 'preference', 'face', or as Brown and Levinson have it 'politeness'.) By 'exploit', I mean that a current action/turn may be designed so as to avoid or to facilitate a future projected move in a recognizable sequential routine.

This introduces the possibility of speakers consciously exploiting routines, where the routines or patterns are sufficiently recognizable and predictable to participants for them quite explicitly to anticipate subsequent actions in a projected sequence. This brings us back to my earlier remarks concerning whether sequential patterns may become the overt objects of interactional mapping and planning, in the conscious attempt to achieve sequential goals. In this respect Heritage (1990/91) distinguishes oriented-to procedures which he terms strategy (cog), and procedures which are consciously employed, or strategy (cs). (In their consideration of intentionality and goals in conversation, Mandelbaum and Pomerantz (1991) make distinctions along similar lines; although their terminology differs from that of Heritage, many of the problems and themes being addressed in their paper are common to those in Heritage,

patterns without planning

planned goal projection

and in this chapter.) The kinds of structural organizations which may 'fit' behaviour, for example the sequence illustrated in extract 1 above, are perhaps

'driven into the organism'. They are (or have become through experience) part of its 'software' or even its neurobiology. Thus strategy (cog) is a property predicated *of* an organism (or its program). It is not something available *to* the organism's (or the program's) unaided inspection. Thus it is relevant to distinguish between a strategy (cog) which *fits* behaviour and a strategy (cs) which *guides* behaviour. (Heritage 1990/91: 315.)

Comparing the pattern of speakers' modifications/backdowns in the face of recipients' withholdings in extracts 2 and 3 with the pre-requests in extract 4, one gets a sense of the fluctuating borderline to which Heritage refers between a strategy (cog) and a speaker employing a strategy (cs). The use of a withholding/silence in order to implicate (but not state) disagreement is oriented to a sequential procedure, the evidence for the consciously strategic use of which is only implicit (in a sequential pattern); by contrast, the conscious use of a sequential routine is quite manifest in extract 4, conspicuously so in the humorous treatment of the pre-sequence enquiry.

Some aspects of conversational strategy

'Avoidance' strategy

Few cases of the conscious exploitation of an anticipated or projected sequential routine will be as demonstrably clear as pre-requests. Most are likely to fluctuate around this borderline between (cog) and (cs) strategies, that is in the space between the second and third types of sequential pattern discussed above. I'd like to review some other patterns in which I think it can be demonstrated that, at the least, a move is made in an interactional sequence which exploits the anticipated development of the sequence. Whether such sequential routines can be consciously or mentally modelled by speakers, and hence whether a speaker is, on a given occasion, consciously exploiting a particular routine in making a particular move, may sometimes be less easily demonstrable – as will become evident, for good reason. Nevertheless, the following kinds of conversational patterns are among those which come closest, I think, to speakers exploiting what they anticipate will follow, in the sequence ahead, from making a given move in a current turn.

The first arises from the conversational routine of greetings exchanges. It involves an observation which Sacks made about telephone calls to a Suicide Prevention Centre, and which, as Schegloff (1992b: xvi) recalls, was a critical step in the development of what was to become conversation

analysis (and it is the observation with which Sacks began his lectures about conversation analysis (see H. Sacks 1992, Vol. I, lecture 1)). Sacks noted that the emergency psychiatric hospital which operated the SPC line was concerned about the regularity with which people who called the centre would not give their names. And when Sacks looked to see ‘where in the course of the conversation could you [*sic*] tell that somebody would not give their name?’ (*ibid.*: 3), he noticed this:

Extract 5 (SPC)

(A is the SPC staff member answering calls, B is the caller.)

- A: This is Mr Smith may I help you?
 → B: I can’t hear you.
 A: This is Mr Smith.
 B: Smith.

Sacks discussed this in the light of the procedure in greetings exchanges whereby the form of address which is adopted by the first speaker may be reciprocally adopted by next speaker. So that if the first speaker (the SPC staff member) identifies himself by name, so might the other (the caller⁹). Sacks observed about extract 5 and cases like it, that in the slot where a reciprocal identification by a caller would be conditionally relevant, the caller instead claims not to be able to hear. In reply to the caller’s claimed trouble, ‘I can’t hear you’, the staff member repeats what he said. In the sequence that therefore ensues – in which the staff member again gives his name; the caller repeats that name, to check that he has it right; the staff member confirms it and asks once more if he can help – the slot in which the caller’s reciprocal self-identification would go never occurs. The caller has thereby managed to skip the move in which he might reciprocate with his name.

Extract 6 (SPC: from H. Sacks 1992, Vol.I: 7–8)

- A: . . my name is Smith and I’m with the Emergency Psychiatric Centre.
 → B: Your name is what?
 A: Smith.
 B: Smith.
 A: Yes.
 A: Can I help you?
 → B: I don’t know hhheh I hope you can.

So there’s a quite standard conversational routine, the procedure for greetings exchanges, which provides for a slot in which the caller should identify himself: it happens that for these callers (i.e., potential suicides)

this slot is unwanted. The caller replaces that slot with an action (a claim not to be able to hear) which generates an extended sequence in which the slot in which he should make a return greeting with his name does not recur.

The question is, though, whether the caller really cannot hear, or whether he is using the claim not to hear as a strategy to avoid giving his name. Well, there is a glimmer of evidence in B's repeat after A has repeated his name. Certainly that's a regular thing to do after there's been a hitch; you ask them to repeat their name, they do so, you repeat it to check you have it right. But then there's the opportunity to latch onto your repeat the reciprocal self-introduction: that is, the turn can be managed in such a way that the opportunity to say who you are isn't lost – if you want to say who you are. For instance, compare B's repeat in extract 6 with the caller's (erroneous) repeat of the receptionist's name in extract 7.

Extract 7 (Minne: Cmas:X:1–2)

CALLER: Who am I talking with. =
 WENDI: = .hhhh This is Wendi the receptionist?
 → CALLER: Linda the receptionist. Linda?hh This is =
 =((click click))
 WENDI: Hello?

Evidently there is some difficulty about hearing in this extract (the caller hears 'Linda' instead of 'Wendi', for example). But notice that having repeated her name, the caller is then about to go on to self-identify with 'This is' before being cut off by some interference with the phone (the call ends after Wendi's 'Hello?'). So there is no difficulty in latching a self-identification onto a repeat if you want the other to know your name. This isn't proof that the caller in the SPC data is consciously using a repeat device as a strategy to avoid giving his name: but what happens, or does not happen, later in a sequence is perhaps relevant internal evidence for anticipatory planning. In this case the possibility is that he's projecting a (repair) sequence, the completion of which will be co-terminous with the end of the greetings exchanges; and hence the slot for his returning with his name will have been 'missed'.

Another case in which, again, a speaker avoids doing something in a sequential position where that action was relevant is illustrated in extract 8. This is from a call in which it is clear that on the coming weekend Charlie is going to drive down to Syracuse, and has arranged to give Ilene a ride. He's calling to tell her that, because the girl with whom he was intending to stay will be out of town, he is not going after all.

Extract 8 (Trip to Syracuse:1)

- CHARLIE: I spoke to the gi:r- I spoke tih Karen.
(0.4)
- CHARLIE: And u:m: (.) it wz rea:lly ba:d because she decided of a:ll
weekends for this one tih go awa:y
(0.6)
- ILENE: Wha:t?
(0.4)
- CHARLIE: She decidih tih go away this weekend.
ILENE: Yea:h,
CHARLIE: .hhh =
ILENE: = .khh
[
- CHARLIE: So tha::t yihknow I really don't have a place tuh
sta:y.
ILENE: .hh Oh:::::hh
ILENE: .hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken?
CHARLIE: Nu::h I don't think so.

One can notice, first off, that it isn't Charlie who says that he's not going this weekend: the explicit version of the 'bad news' is articulated by Ilene ('.hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken?'), much in line with Terasaki's observations about pre-announcements of bad news eliciting news deliveries from the erstwhile new recipient (Terasaki 1976; Schegloff 1988b). There is, of course, a similarity between this case and extract 4, insofar as the pre-request in extract 4 worked to elicit an offer, without Skip having formally to make the request: and here Charlie manages the sequence so as to avoid saying that he is not going, but instead to put Ilene in the position of figuring out and 'announcing' the bad news. The way the sequence runs off, Charlie is left just to confirm the bad news ('Nuh:: I don't think so.'). The speaker who initiated the sequence has managed it in such a way as to avoid doing an unwanted, dispreferred action, i.e., delivering bad news.

But a more intricate 'negotiation' can be discerned in this sequence, involving each of the participants avoiding making certain actions and thereby extending the projected sequence. I'll give only a skeletal account of this negotiation. Charlie's first version of the 'bad news' (in his first turn in the extract) is only that Karen will be away; he doesn't state the consequence this has for the arrangement he has with Ilene. In the next slot, Ilene might have given some form of acknowledgement of that upshot (e.g., along the lines of the disappointed 'Oh:::::' she expresses later). Instead she makes the kind of claim not to have heard, or the repair/repeat device which Sacks noted the caller uses in extracts 5 and 6, when she asks 'Wha:t?'

- CHARLIE: And u:m: (.) it wz rea:lly ba:d because she decided of a:ll
weekends for this one tih go awa:y
(0.6)
- ILENE: Wha:t?
(0.4)
- CHARLIE: She decidih tih go away this weekend.

Charlie's partial repeat, 'She decidih tih go away this weekend', elects to treat the problem only as one of hearing, and not that what he said needs clarifying or elaborating (which might of course have put him in the position of making explicit the consequence of Karen's being away, as in 'Karen decided to go away this weekend, so I'm not going up after all'). In the next slot Ilene passes over yet another opportunity to acknowledge the upshot of the news; she fills that slot with a continuer, 'Yea:h,', which leaves Charlie back in the position of announcing his news:

- CHARLIE: She decidih tih go away this weekend.
- ILENE: Yea:h,
- CHARLIE: .hhhh =
- ILENE: = .khh
- [
- CHARLIE: So tha:t yihknow I really don't have a place tuh
sta:y.

Charlie does now reveal a consequence of Karen's being away: but it's a version in which the upshot for Ilene's ride still remains implicit, his not having a place to stay being only another step towards the news that he's not going. Charlie has thereby managed that slot to extend the sequence in such a way that it's still left to Ilene, in her next slot, to state the upshot/bad news.

In each slot after Charlie's first turn, some acknowledgement or explicit formulation of the bad news was possibly relevant. Each of them, however, manages their turns in those slots so as to avoid performing that action; each turn is designed to project a sequence in which it is left to the other, if they will, to state or to acknowledge the upshot for their trip.

'Facilitating' future sequential moves

The emphasis in the cases considered above has been on participants *avoiding* performing some action in a slot in which that action might have been relevant, and extending the sequence in order to provide a slot for the co-participant to perform an equivalent action instead. I want to move to consider sequences in which a speaker designs a current turn so as to *generate or facilitate* a subsequent action in the sequence. The distinction is sometimes more a matter of emphasis: cases in this set, though, don't involve the degree of avoidance that was evident in extracts 5 to 8.

Perhaps the clearest instances of anticipatory planning are sequences in which, like the pre-requests discussed earlier, a speaker designs a turn which projects that, after recipient's response, another turn of a particular kind will be forthcoming. This is often the case in story telling, which can be initiated thus: A: 'Did I tell you about such-and-such?' B: 'No.' A: 'Well, [story].' A's first turn/enquiry is designed to project a subsequent telling, though that telling might be contingent upon the recipient's response. Two kinds of environments with which these projected action sequences are associated are what Schegloff has called 'preliminaries to preliminaries', and stories.

Schegloff (1980) observed that enquiries such as 'Do you mind if I ask you a question?' are, paradoxically, already questions; and that quite regularly what follows (i.e., after the recipient replies 'No, go ahead') is not a question, or at least not *the* question. This is one of the instances he cites.

Extract 9 (BC:12:18–19)

(A is the compère in a radio phone-in programme, B is the caller.)

- B: I like tuh ask you something.
- A: Shoot.
- B: Y'know I 'ad my license suspended fuh six munts,
- A: Uh huh
- B: Y'know for a reason which, I rathuh not, mention
tuh you, in othuh words, – a serious reason,
- en I like tuh know if I w'd talk to my senator,
- or- somebuddy, could they help me get it back,

Schegloff (1980: 106) notes about this and similar instances that there is a kind of double displacement: 'Not only has the question that the speaker plans been "displaced" by his "projection" of its occurrence, but it is also not asked next.' Instead of the projected question, the thing that B would like to ask, B reports something (losing his driving licence): and only after that does he ask his question. Hence, B's initial turn projects an action after the next (i.e., a question, after a reporting). This is no place to review Schegloff's analysis of such 'pre-pre's' (but see Streeck, Chapter 4, this volume), except to highlight his point that 'They serve to exempt what directly follows them from being treated as "produced in its own right". They make room for, and mark, what follows them as "preliminary"' (1980: 116). What they are designed to achieve is the 'space' to give a report as a preliminary to something else, i.e., the enquiry – and thereby to restrict the recipient to *not* responding to the report as such, but to wait for the projected enquiry. Note that after the first stage of B's report in extract 9, A restricts himself to merely acknowledging it, and letting B continue.

Evidently, then, there is a symmetry between what the pre-pre is designed to achieve, and the recipient's understanding of that task; that is, his understanding that the subsequent action (the report) is *not* the one to deal with, but that instead he should respond to the action after that (the enquiry). The pre-pre is a shared intersubjective device for anticipatory planning. In the pre-request in extract 5 the evidence for the shared character of such a device was the humorous recognition by the recipient of what was anticipated: in extract 9, the evidence is that the recipient refrains from responding (other than with a continuer) until after the projected action. Either way, the co-participants' mutual orientation to projected action sequences is manifest in the recipients' behaviour, in a manner which connects closely with the issues Goody raises about the reciprocity of social relations in AIP.

Schegloff relates his analysis of 'preliminaries to preliminaries' to the other environment associated with projected action sequences, that of stories – and of course 'story prefaces'. These have been discussed extensively in the literature of conversation and discourse analysis, and are perhaps too familiar to need much elaboration here. Schegloff summarizes their employment thus:

The story preface is a device by which a prospective teller can display an intention to tell a story and yield a next turn to another, with the possible outcome that that other will reselect the prospective teller to talk again, that is to tell the story, in the course of which others will not treat each possible sentence/turn completion as a point at which possibly to take a next turn for themselves. (Schegloff 1980: 146.)

We might note here that in 'displaying an intention', the speaker does also intend to tell a story; so that the procedure, and the consciousness of the procedure's purpose, are indistinguishable.

I want to show just one example, in order to highlight the point concerning the shared orientation to projected action sequences: that is, whilst the prospective story teller initiates the projected sequence with a story preface, the recipient collaborates in the anticipatory planning by holding off until the projected action has been completed. This is thrown into relief by an instance where this goes awry.

Extract 10 (F:TC:1:1:18)

(The Warehouse is evidently a bar in which Shirley has a part-time job.)

SHIRLEY: .hhh Listen, something very very: cute happened
las' night at the Warehouse.
(.)

- GERI: What.
[
- SHIRLEY: .hhhhhYihKNOW Cathy, (.) Larry Taylor's ex
girlfriend,
[
- GERI: Yeeah.
- SHIRLEY: Okay. Cathy came in las'night.
(1.0)
- SHIRLEY: Whenever she comes in she always wants me t'do
something for her.
- GERI: M-hm,
- SHIRLEY: Either siddown'n ta:lk, whatever. .hhhhh So she
came in en she starts asking me if I'd seen Gary.
Gary Klei:n, .hhhh I s'd yeh he's here t'night
.hh she sz well wouldju go find him please'n tell
him t'give me my ten dollars that he owes me,
→ GERI: Whaddiyu haftih get in on that for,
[[
- SHIRLEY: .hhhh Wai:t. I
started lau:ghing I looked at her en I said
(story continues))

It is fairly clear that Geri's 'contingent response' to the story telling, turns out to have been premature. Having restricted herself to responses which 'fit' the course of the projected sequence, Geri responds (in her arrowed turn) with the appropriate outrage to the report that Cathy asked Shirley to run an errand for her, thereby treating that as the 'something cute that happened at the Warehouse last night', and therefore the completion of the story projected in the preface. Now as it happens she's wrong, because that's only the beginning of the story. Shirley sanctions the premature response ('Wai:t.'), and does not respond in turn to Geri's outraged 'understanding' of the story. Instead she goes on to recount not only how she refused to get Cathy's money, but also a later incident in which Cathy was discovered to be drinking alcohol (underage), to which Shirley was deputed to put a stop. That's the *real* story, elaborately told over three and a half pages of transcript, during which Geri's responses are restricted once again to continuers.

Control

Thus story prefaces designedly 'control' a projected sequence (the story telling) in which the recipient's speaking role is restricted. But notice that this 'control' is only achieved through anticipatory planning on the part of both participants, recipient as well as story teller. Geri's premature incoming in extract 10 is not of course a deviant case (i.e., not an instance of non-collaboration, or evidence that story prefaces don't control the

projected telling). She comes in with her appreciation or understanding of 'the story' at just the point where what has been told fits, and is a possible completion of, what the preface is designed to have her anticipate, the 'something cute that happened'. So the sequential control which is achieved through story prefaces is collaboratively managed. Again, to emphasize; the intentionality of sequential control is plainly an intersubjective, oriented-to property of story telling. For this reason, story prefaces, as with other kinds of prefatory actions (such as pre-sequences) are important evidence for AIP.

Finally, it may be worth noting in this context that moving onto or off topics of conversation may involve some degree of 'control' over the projected talk – and that this control can have a strategic character. This is perhaps evident in such instances as these, in which a speaker opens up a 'new' topic,¹⁰ in a fashion which has the appearance of a stepwise connection with what was being talked about.

Extract 11 (NB:II:2:5)

(They have been talking about the assassination of Robert Kennedy a few days before, and to which Nancy refers when she says 'everybody is talking about it'.)

- NANCY: Yeah it's been a rough week an everbuddy is (.) youknow
(0.2)
- EMMA: Mmhm
[
- NANCY: ta:lking about it en everbuddy: course I: don't
know whether it's that or just that we're js:t (.)
→ completely bo:gging down at work,h .hhhhmh
(.)
- NANCY: Er whatta WIH: WITH ME: with my finals?hhh
[
- EMMA: Oh: well e v r y buddy's sa::d
- NANCY: hhuh uh:::
[
- EMMA: Oh ho:w'd you do with yer finals.

Extract 12 (NB:II:4:10)

(They have just been talking at length about an operation Emma has had on her toe, and whether they'll both go shopping.)

- EMMA: A:nd uh I just am not gunnuh walk around a LOT
bec:u:z uh: Ah:::,hh (.) It's not worth it tuh be

in overlap, Emma seems to be going to describe the day, but cuts off). It connects back to figuring that they would be up by now, and forward to 'late night' (i.e., late rising after a late night – even if the late rising is Emma's, and the late night was Nancy's). So too 'bogging down at work' connects back to why it's been a 'rough week' for everyone, and provides a warrant for introducing her finals (that being a form of work, and a form of labour which might be described as 'rough').

Parenthetically, it may be noticed that these pivotal segments, 'bogging down at work' and 'sleep in day' have an idiomatic quality. This may not be incidental to the use of idioms to 'legitimately' or accountably close down a prior topic (Drew and Holt 1988). That is, they may be being used here by a speaker who wants to close down one topic in order to open up something she's keen to talk about.

At any rate, in the light of what the speaker goes on to talk about, it looks as though the pivotal segments are designed to project a next and valued topic. But the speaker thereby contrives to manage the introduction of the new topic as a 'natural progression' out of a sequence of other materials. This looks very much like a strategy for disguising just how keen the speaker is to tell about it: to take a point from Sacks on invitations, managing the introduction of a topic in this way displays the topic as having been *occasioned by* other materials, and not as the reason for calling.

Discussion: sequential patterns and 'conscious' strategies?

There can be little doubt that whilst structures of sequences of turns/actions are part of the cognitive processes through which the coherence of those sequences was produced in the first place in the course of interaction, the mental models of such structures may not be conscious, articulated resources. Sequential structures are some of the *procedures* whereby co-participants discover the meaning in, and goals behind, one another's utterances: that is, they are procedures which lie behind participants' analyses of meaning/action. The adjacent next turn is a basic structural position in interaction because it is there that participants' analyses or understandings of what they took the other to be meaning/doing are displayed (understandings which may be ratified or repaired in the next turn after that, i.e., third turn (see Schegloff 1992a)). But although participants' analyses of one another's behaviour are certainly part of the 'conscious' level of conversation, the procedures which lie at the back of those analyses or understandings may not be.

Brown and Levinson's (1978: 90) caveat about their use of strategy arises, I think, from just that distinction between participants' analyses of one another's utterances, and the (cognitive) procedures which underlie their analyses. Participants' understandings of what the other means, or is up to, are indeed the conscious rational products of routines which

themselves may not generally be subject to conscious modelling or deliberation. The social intelligibility and perceived rationality of talk-in-interaction is the product of the procedures – including sequential structures – which are part of the learned programmes which underlie social intelligence.

However, I have been reviewing some instances in which sequential routines are perhaps being employed strategically – in its sense of the conscious management of slots in a sequence whose organization can be anticipated by speakers. It may be worth highlighting some aspects of how I think this sense of conscious ‘strategy’ might be attributed to the kinds of cases I have described.

It should be stressed that none of the sequential devices considered above is intrinsically strategic. Sacks makes the following remark about the use of ‘I can’t hear you’ in extracts 5 and 6 above:

a device like ‘I can’t hear you’ – the repeat device, providing for a repetition of the thing that was first said, which is then repeated by the first person who said ‘I can’t hear you’ – is not necessarily designed for skipping a move. It is not specific to providing a way of keeping in the conversation and behaving properly while not giving one’s name. It can be used for other purposes and do other tasks, and it can be used with other items. That’s why I talk about it as an ‘occasional device’. (H. Sacks 1992: 7.)

Similarly ‘what?’, as in extract 8, pauses as in extracts 2 and 3, and enquiries like ‘What are you doing?’, such as that in extract 4, may all be used – indeed may generally be used – in other sequential environments or to manage sequential tasks quite different from the possibly strategic goals illustrated above. For example, just as someone may respond with ‘What?’ or ‘I can’t hear you’ in circumstances where indeed they didn’t hear what the other said, so also someone might enquire ‘What are you doing?’ just out of interest. It’s not necessarily designedly a preliminary to something else, such as an invitation.¹²

Strategy in talk exploits the ordinary properties of ordinary sequential devices: thus the particular strategic work which a device may occasionally do is done at an *unofficial* level (on this, and many of the other issues being discussed here, see Mandelbaum and Pomerantz (1991)). The official business of ‘I can’t hear you’ or ‘What?’ is to repair a problem to do with hearing (or possibly, in the latter case, understanding/clarification); and such objects are responded to by recipients in terms of their official business (for analyses of the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ work that the same object can do in conversation, see Pomerantz (1980) and Drew (1984)). The very matter of the talk being apparently organized in terms of the official business of some sequential objects has the consequence that its strategic but unofficial business may not show through on the surface of the conversation – indeed, it may be properly designed not to intrude or be recognized at that level (for the sakes of both participants). The

ambiguity which results from an object's official and simultaneously possibly unofficial business is a resource whereby participants can (sometimes collaboratively) manage to disguise an object's strategic use. It is for this very reason that finding evidence in linguistic analysis for speakers' conscious strategies of anticipatory planning has proved so intractable. If it is to be hidden from co-participants, it may remain hidden from analysts.

Hence the rather special character of cases like extract 4, in which there is explicit acknowledgement by the participants that the enquiry was not 'innocent' but was leading up to something. Mostly, though, the analytic evidence that a turn has been designed to exploit other ('unofficial') properties and the anticipated sequential consequences of those properties is much less easy to discern. In the kinds of cases reviewed here, my best shot at what that evidence might be is that speakers exploit a sequential routine, in which the slot for a given action can be projected in the next turn, or the turn after that (i.e., the third turn). The anticipated slot in the sequence may be one which is valued/wanted, or unwanted/to be avoided. A current turn exploits such anticipated slots, by *initiating* the routine sequence which will hence generate the projected and valued slot.

Alternatively, in cases in which the projected slot is unwanted/to be avoided, there is evidence that the sequence is being 'misshaped', by being either *expanded* or *attenuated*. In expansions, the next turn is a slot in which the projected but unwanted action is relevant: the speaker avoids that action by instead filling that slot with an alternative action, the occurrence of which is occasioned by different and, thus far, unanticipated relevancies or contingencies. In this respect, troubles (in hearing etc.) are especially exploitable, because troubles are quite freely occurring in conversation; they may inhabit any turn-at-talk, and hence a 'next turn repair initiation' may always be mobilized in order to avoid doing something else (the unwanted action) in that turn.

But devices for avoiding relevant actions in the next slot are not restricted to repair devices. Extract 13 is an instance of something which may be quite frequently done: a speaker makes a sequential move which avoids an inauspicious environment, and instead delays a planned next move until a more auspicious environment can be produced. This extract illustrates just such an avoidance/delay: Emma's invitation to Nancy for lunch follows a pre-sequence enquiry 'What are you doing?' (not shown).

Extract 13 (NB:II:2:14)

EMMA: Wanna come down'n av a bite'a l:unch with me:?=
I got s'm bee:r en stu:ff,
(0.2)

- NANCY: Wul yer ril sweet hon:, uh::m
(0.9)
- NANCY: l e t I: ha(v)
[
- EMMA: or d'yuh'av sump'n else (t')
[
- NANCY: No:, I haf to uh call Rol's
mother. .h I told'er I:'d ca:ll 'er this morning-I
gotta letter from 'er en (.) .hhhhh A:ndum
(1.0)
- NANCY: p.So sh- in the letter she said if you can why (.)
yihknow call me Sa:turday mor:ning en I just
haven't hh.
- EMMA: Mm hm
[
- NANCY: .hh It's like takin' a beating. (.) mhh heh.
heh heh hh.
[
- EMMA: Mm:: 'N yuh have'n heard a word huh.
(Nancy then reports and talk continues for some while
about her ex-husband's failure to get in touch with her or
any of the family.))

There are two positions in which Emma forestalls a rejection, or rejection implication. The first is when, after Nancy's appreciation and then evident hesitation, Emma anticipates the possibility of an upcoming rejection, and heads it off with 'or d'yuh 'av sump'n else' (it might do so only in the sense of now providing a slot for an account, in place of a slot in which Nancy might have been going to reject the invitation). The second occasion is her response to Nancy's account of what she has to do, and Nancy's complaint that 'It's like takin' a beating'. In that slot Emma might have displayed an understanding of the 'bad news' implication (as did Ilene in the previous extract) of the account for her lunch invitation, for example through a marker of disappointment. Instead Emma focuses on Nancy's ex-husband and what he's not doing – 'N yuh have'n heard a word huh.' – rather than on the call to her mother-in-law. Emma thereby avoids making explicit any upshot, for her invitation, of Nancy's having to make a call. In other words, by picking up on that particular implication of Nancy's account Emma manages to divert the talk away from the invitation (opening a 'new' topic, rather in the manner that Nancy did in extracts 11 and 12), until another and more auspicious opportunity arises to re-introduce her invitation – which she does several minutes later (for an analysis of which see Drew (1984)).

Sequence expansions therefore appear to be one means for avoiding unwanted actions. Sequence attentuations appear to be rather less

common; indeed they might be restricted to sequential objects like pre-sequences, in which the pre-sequence enquiry or noticing is designed with an eye to the possibility that the recipient will make an offer, thus absolving the speaker from the necessity of having to make a request. Hence, the slot in which a request might have been made, after the recipient's response to the pre-request, is displaced by the recipient replying right away with an offer.¹³ Of course such attenuations cannot be guaranteed; they rely on co-participants' collaboration, and that is not always forthcoming.

Sequence initiations, attentuations and expansions do not by themselves constitute evidence that speakers consciously anticipate some future move/action, and attempt to facilitate or avoid that projected move, depending on whether the action is valued or unwanted. The advantage of treating sequences and sequential slots/objects as *procedures* is that it avoids mentalistic attributions; and it avoids the seemingly intractable analytic task of deciding whether a speaker 'knows' that by doing something in this slot, they'll avoid having to do something else in a subsequent slot.

The disadvantage is that *any* sequential object can be regarded as a procedure: and so the distinction between kinds of sequences that I was trying to make at the outset of the chapter would count for nothing. All sequential patterns would be equivalent. Some routines are perhaps part of the vernacular: by contrast, the organizations of other sequences are not projectable by participants. So this disadvantage of referring only to 'procedures' folds into another, that that may fail to capture the projectable, anticipated moves which are contingent upon a current move. When, in designing a current turn, a speaker selects which activity shall go in that turn – in many of the cases reviewed above, departing from and expanding the 'standard' sequence – that selection must involve a degree of 'consciousness'. There seems no reason in principle to deny a commensurate degree of consciousness to constructing a current turn with an eye to a subsequent anticipated turn. Of course it's not the principle but the empirical substantiation of conscious strategy in some of the cases reviewed here, and in other interactional sequences, that causes us to vacillate between regarding them as empirical instances of procedural, programmable cognitive strategies, to the possibility that they are instances of speakers' conscious strategies in anticipating how to achieve certain outcomes in projected sequences. That empirical substantiation may involve the kinds of issues I have been discussing here concerning sequential initiation, attentuation and expansion.

Notes

- 1 This is close, I think, to Byrne and Whiten's middle level (level one) of 'intentional behaviour' in animals, which includes 'behaviour that is convincingly intentional, in the sense of goal directed, . . . [although] the category is agnostic as to the animal's mental states . . . [Hence] to qualify as tactical deception, an action must therefore indicate at least Level One evidence of intention to achieve a goal which can only be reached if an individual is deceived (*not* the same thing as "evidence of an intention to deceive")' (Byrne and Whiten 1991). The agnosticism of this category as regards the intentionality of action (for example, to deceive another) parallels that of 'oriented to procedures' in conversation analytic research. See for instance Heritage (1990/91).
- 2 Levinson (Chapter 11, this volume, n. 13) discusses just such a level of (self-)consciousness about the practice of handshaking during greetings and partings, in circumstances where interactants are from different cultural backgrounds. But such moments as he describes of indecision and misinterpretation are equally familiar in exchanges between people who share a common culture, but are not sure which of the candidate greetings routines they should adopt.
- 3 More complex sequential patterns are perhaps less likely to be consciously managed because knowledge about them may generally not be part of the vernacular. (For some observations on this, see Jefferson (1988a:439).)
- 4 Sequences in which there is a measure of control over the turn-after-next (i.e. the third turn) are more familiar in institutional settings; for instance in classroom interaction, participants' orientation to the 'correctness' (or otherwise) of answers generates sequences in which teachers respond to students' answers to their questions by evaluating those answers, in a third turn.
- 5 These findings are for a study of English (American and English) speakers. The anthropological literature, some of which is cited in Drew (1987), suggests that teasing in other societies generates different patterns, and that therefore such patterns are cultural forms. Esther Goody (personal communication) reports that in Gonja, teases *have* to be responded to in a joking fashion. I want to note, however, that the same might be said of teasing in English/American culture: that is, there is a normative orientation to 'humour' as the proper response to teasing, even though on many or most occasions people who are teased 'fail' to respond as they should. So, for example, the laughter which regularly precedes the po-faced response, as here in Nancy's initial response in extract 1, is certainly evidence that participants orient to normative expectations, in advance of flouting them. Having not studied the details of the design of responses to teases in Gonja or in other cultures, I am not qualified to say whether anything similar happens (e.g., that the Gonja display an orientation to a proper joking response, whilst simultaneously defending themselves in a 'serious' fashion. But I am yet to be convinced that teasing and conventionalized normative responses to teasing are indeed a cultural form.
- 6 They are 'backward looking' in a less obvious sense, that of 'recasting' the character of the prior turns: so that the tease recasts the prior turn as having been exaggerated, and the po-faced response treats the 'joking' tease as having

had a serious import. Hence there is a retroactive quality to the manner in which turns in the sequence 're-interpret' prior turns, as discussed by Good in his contribution to this volume (Chapter 6).

- 7 Perhaps the clearest and most elaborate example of this kind of 'non-strategic' sequential pattern is the six-stage sequence which Jefferson describes for troubles telling in conversation (Jefferson 1988b). She refers to this pattern as a 'candidate sequence' because it is an artificial construction of a sequence which empirically never runs off in the precise order of the template she documents. The disorder is generated by the troubles-telling sequence being constantly encroached upon, and recurrently breached, by the pressure towards business as usual, to which talk about trouble seems irrevocably vulnerable, and to the concerns of which a "trouble" appears to be irremediably subordinate and accountable' (Jefferson 1988a: 440). Whilst progression through the troubles-telling sequence is therefore susceptible to participants' orientation to a quite general interactional principle (business as usual), that principle is embodied in the design of a given turn without being strategically mobilized with a view to (facilitating or avoiding) any actions later in the sequence.
- 8 In this respect it may be no accident that in their chapters in this volume both Streeck and Levinson also cite instances of pre-sequences in the context of the projectability associated with sequences.
- 9 This is illustrated in the greetings which precede the pre-request for a ride in extract 4 in a rather interesting way. The person who answers gives his name, rather formally; the caller then gives his name – but not before re-addressing, as it were, 'J.P. Blenkinsop' as 'Jim', for which an appropriate reciprocal diminutive, 'It's Skip', is used.
- 10 I am leaving aside for present an issue of considerable importance for AIP generally, and specifically for the possibility of the consciousness of AIP strategies; this is the matter of how some topics, especially sensitive ones, are initiated or introduced into the conversation. The recipient's design of topical initial utterances which include explicit reference to such matters as what has happened since we last spoke, or accounts of why one is calling or introducing this topic (on which, see especially Jefferson (1984)), might be analysed for evidence of a speaker's conscious planning of how to introduce the topic. Wootton (personal communication) suggests that offer sequences frequently involve some manifest planning on the part of the one making the offer, in the face of the delicacy of what is offered.
- 11 This is the man Nancy is describing in extract 1.
- 12 However, my guess is that the particular details of the design of 'What are you doing?' enquiries which are disinterestedly interested are probably different from the design of the 'same' enquiry when it's intended as a preliminary to something; and that from these design details, recipients have little difficulty in figuring out which sort of enquiry it is. Whether that's true of other devices such as 'I can't hear you' and other repairs we do not yet know.
- 13 Elsewhere I discussed a similar phenomenon in cases where, instead of inviting the recipient, the speaker uses a device, a form of 'reporting', which is designed to elicit a self-invitation by the recipient: similarly, reporting a difficulty may be designed to give the recipient the opportunity to offer assistance. (See Drew 1984.)